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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-
EMPLOYMENT TESTS
In 1955, the Duke Power Company realized that their operations were
becoming more complex and their employees were unable to grasp new
situations, due primarily to new technological advances. They proceeded
thereby, to institute the requirement that an employee, either black or
white, had to have a high school education or its equivalent' in order to
transfer from the Labor Department 2 into Operations, Maintenance, Coal
Handling, or Laboratory and Testing. This policy was subsequently
amended by providing that anyone who had been employed prior to
September 1, 1965 that did not meet the previous qualifications could
become eligible for promotion or transfer by passing a general intelli-
gence test s and a general mechanical test.4 Consequently, Willie S. Griggs
and twelve other black employees brought a class action under Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act5 to enjoin Duke Power Company from dis-
criminating against them.
The district court6 found that prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, Duke Power Company had openly discriminated on the basis
of race in their hiring practices; however, the court also found that these
practices had ceased subsequent to July 2, 1965 and consequently there
1. Such as a Certificate of Completion of General Education Development
(GED) tests, high school level.
2. At the time of this action, all of the black employees at the Dan River
Station had been relegated to the Labor Department; the least desirable and lowest
paid station at the plant.
3. The 12 minute Wonderlic Test.
4. The 30 minute Bennett Mechanical AA Test; only three or four of the
fourteen black workers could satisfy these tests-the fourth black worker, Willie
Boyd, had achieved a diploma by passing an equivalency examination.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1964) provides that: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race. . ....
Section 2000e-2(h) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this
(title), it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided
that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, in-
tended, or used to discriminate because of race .. "
6. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (D.C. N.C. 1968).
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was no affirmative relief available. Judge Gordon, speaking for the court,
felt that Title VII was only to be applied prospectively and could not
erase the inequities of prior discrimination. The court of appeals7 stated
that a subjective and not an objective test of the employer's intent should
be used to determine whether the adoption of hiring criteria had a dis-
criminatory purpose. The appellate court thereby sustained the district
court, but reversed in part, holding that previous discrimination resulting
from prior practices was insulated from remedial action. The Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that any employment test "must
measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." Griggs
v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
This decision is significant because it is the culmination of a series of
cases and administrative decisions which have attempted to interpret Sec-
tion 703 (h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The purpose
of this case note is to explore the history of tests and diploma require-
ments that have to be job-related and to postulate on the future trend
which might result from this landmark decision.
At the onset, employment discrimination is much harder to handle than
other forms of discrimination.8  It has been acknowledged that employ-
ment tests pervade our lives. 9 They are employed as the first hurdle
7. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
8. A basic education is considered to be the birthright of every American and
the denial of such has always aroused opposition. See Brown v. Board of Education,
349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Shuttles-
worth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958);
Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. S.C. 1955). See also VOSE, CAUCASIANS
ONLY, THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT,
(1967). This attitude and concern, however, has not been reflected in Ameri-
ca's views toward employment discrimination. In order to bring minority groups
equal economic opportunity, all forms of discrimination must be met head on.
From the birth of the black baby through his total maturation, he is met with
overt and covert forms of discrimination that shape his basic philosophies and atti-
tudes. See for an excellent account of the discriminatory practices that effect
black children, PETTIGREW, A PROFILE ON THE NEGRO AMERICAN (1964); WRIGHT,
BLACK Boy (1945).
To begin with, the inferior education that the minority group child receives in
many communities effectively eliminates him from high-level employment. When
disenfranchised, he is robbed of his chance to improve himself through the ballot
box. The Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 promised to improve the blackman's
position at the ballot box, however the improvement has been seen minimally.
See generally Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); TAPER, GoMILLION V.
LIGHTFOOT, APARTHEID IN ALABAMA (1962). Housing discrimination too has its
effects; when the black man is not permitted to live near his choice of work, or is
cloistered into "ghettoes" where the schools are inferior, the total picture is made
bleaker and the effects of employment discrimination are felt more strongly.
9. For an excellent account of seniority and testing violations under Title VII,
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in being considered for a job, in that the applicant must obtain a minimum
score before he is given any consideration. Consequently, discrimination
in this initial phase of employment precludes the individual from advanc-
ing toward his personal goals.
Because of the wide variety of employment tests, i.e., I.Q. to mechanical
aptitude, and the equally wide variety of skills that are required in order
to achieve successful results, the member of a minority group is handi-
capped from the beginning.' 0 The evidence indicates that on the ma-
jority of these tests, performance of minority group members is sub-
stantially poorer than that of the majority. With this disadvantage at
the inception, the outlook for the individual member of a minority group
is limited to the lowest paid jobs in society. In rebuttal, employers
seek to justify the use of these tests because they supposedly delineate
those persons qualified to fill vacancies. This presents an obvious con-
tradiction but yet an obvious quandry for the employer legitimately seek-
ing to fill a position.
What is not considered, however, is that "[c]ontrary to popular belief,
the likelihood that scores on any particular aptitude test will correlate sig-
nificantly with performance on any particular job is very slim indeed."' ,
The tests are often administered by employers without any evaluation of
their particular needs, while the information that is supposed to be ferreted
out is not adjusted to the applicant population.
The 1964 Civil Rights Act was the initial attempt by Congress to alle-
viate the problems that those in the minority faced in the employment
area. 12 Paralleling the Civil Rights Act was President Johnson's Execu-
tive Order No. 112461 which forbids employment discrimination by gov-
ernment contractors and requires the implementation by "affirmative ac-
see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A Gen-
eral Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1598 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cooper & Soboll.
10. See, Bannister, Slater & Radzan, The Use of Cognitive Tests in Nursing
Candidate Selection, 36 OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 75 (1962); Kirkwood, Selection
Techniques and the Law: To Test or not to Test?, 44 PERSONNEL 18 (1967).
11. Cooper & Sobol at 1643.
12. Thirty-five states had statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in employ-
ment by the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 went into effect. See Purdy,
Title VII: Relationship and Effect on State Action, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV.
525, 527 (1966). The states not having such laws were Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. The definitions of
discriminatory practices, of course, differed; and as with Title VII, voluntary com-
pliance and agency hearings were the usual practice.
13. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Comp. 1964-65).
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tion programs" to assure the attainment of equal employment. Title VII
was the first comprehensive "equal employment opportunities" law ever
passed by Congress. There were still, however, a penumbra of problems
that remained unsolved. The problem of determining whether employ-
ment discrimination had occurred, and the obstacles of collecting suffi-
cient factual data to prove the charge, was far more subtle and complex
than in the areas of other forms of racial discrimination. In the area of
employment testing practices alone, there is the problem of proving that
although the testing practices are overtly fair and impartial, their effect on
minority groups will bring the practices under Title VII.14
The first frontal attack on discriminatory employment practices was in
the area of "neutral" employment standards. In Asbestos Workers Local
53 v. Vogler,15 the union practice of limiting induction of apprentices to
relatives of existing members was found invalid under Title VII because
it perpetuated past discrimination. Another case, Johnson v. Ritz Associ-
ates, Inc.,'6 involved a New York hotel's refusal to hire desk clerks with-
out experience. This practice was found to be violative of the New York
law 7 because of former business practices. Had this practice been al-
lowed to continue, the effect would be to eliminate members of minority
groups from consideration for the positions. These two cases have had
far reaching effect, not only in gaining access for minority group members
to these jobs but also as a basis to challenge other discriminatory practices:
[C]ases, such as these may have far broader implications, suggesting application of
fair employment laws to challenge many other seemingly neutral employment prac-
tices that adversely affect minority group job opportunities, s
A look into the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gives
a good indication of exactly what the Congress envisioned when it passed
the legislation. The test clause in Section 703(h), introduced by Senator
John Tower, provides that an employer should be free
to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test pro-
vided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, in-
tended or used to discriminate because of race. .... 19
This clause was inserted as a direct response to a decision2° by a hearing
14. Cooper & Sobol at 1637.
15. 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
16. Case No. C12,750-66 (New York State Commission for Human Rights,
undated).
17. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-ia(a) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
18. Cooper & Sobol at 1601.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). See also 110 CONG. REC. 13504 (1964).
20. Myart v. Motorola, a text of the examiner's opinion may be found at 110
CONG. REC. 9030-33 (1964); 110 CONG. REc. 9024 (1964) which quotes an edi-
torial of the Chicago Tribune, March 7, 1964.
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examiner under the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act.21 This case
went so far as to say that any test which had an adverse effect on blacks
would be invalid. The salient point of the case was that the examiner
failed to take under consideration the business needs of the employer.22
The opponents of the Tower Amendment, however, felt that the orig-
inal wording of the Bill protected employers from actions such as those
taken by the hearing examiner in Myart v. Motorola.2 3 Instead the oppo-
nents favored the position advanced by Senators Clark and Case. These
men had presented an interpretive memorandum previous to Tower's
amendment which stated:
There is no requirement in title (sic) VII that employers abandon bona fide qualifi-
cation tests where, because of differences in background and education, members
of some groups are able to perform better on these tests than members of other
groups. An employer may set his qualifications as high as he likes, he may test to
determine which applicants have these qualifications, and he may hire, assign, and
promote on the basis of test performance. 24
In subsequent comments by Senator Case, this memorandum was severely
constrained 25 and as a result it does not allow a carte blanche authoriza-
tion to the use of unrestricted tests.
Senator Tower's amendment was eventually rejected by the Senate26
and subsequently, he introduced the much weaker version which had
previously been cleared with the proponents of the bill.27
The legislative history of the Act leads one to believe that the test
clause of Section 703(h) was designed to give a clarifying effect. 28
Moreover, since the original and presumably more permissive, form of the test
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 855 (1969).
22. As a consequence, Senator Tower introduced his amendment which he
felt "would not legalize discriminatory tests." 110 CONG. REC. 13504 (1964).
He only sought to protect testing procedures that were "designed to determine
or predict whether (an) individual is suitable or trainable with respect to his em-
ployment in the particular job or enterprise involved." 110 CONG. REC. 13492
(1964).
23. Myart v. Motorola, supra note 20.
24. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
25. 110 CONG. REC. 13504 (1964).
26. 110 CONG. REC. 13503-04 (1964).
27. Speaking on the new version, which eventually became incorporated as
part of § 703(h), Senator Humphrey stated: "Senators on both sides of the aisle
who were deeply interested in Title VII have examined the text of this amend-
ment and have found it to be in accord with the intent and purpose of that title."
110 CONG. REC. 13274 (1964).
28. Petitioners Brief to the Supreme Court at 50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); Cooper & Sobol at 1653.
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clause included a business needs requirement for tests, it seems likely that the re-
quirement was also implied in the less permissive version that was enacted.2 9
Section 703(h) has subsequently been extensively interpreted by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as
EEOC) .30
The EEOC has interpreted Section 703(h) uniformly since its incep-
tion. It has insisted on "job-relatedness" as the fair measure of all tests
and educational standards. The test must
fairly measure the knowledge or particular skills required by the particular job or
class of jobs which the applicant seeks or which fairly affords the employer a chance
to measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular job or class of jobs. The
fact that a test was prepared by an individual or organization claiming expertise in
test preparation does not, without more, justify its use within the meaning of Title
VII.31
This same stand is also taken by the EEOC regarding educational require-
ments. 32  Even more currently, this problem has been elaborated by new
EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.33  These pre-
dures were issued specifically to cover intelligence and aptitude tests. In
order to qualify, employers must have
data demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with im-
portant elements of work behavior comprising or relevant to the job or jobs for
which Guidelines are being evaluated.34
It would be utter foolishness if it were otherwise. Employers could use
any test that they wished as long as it had been professionally developed;
e.g., requiring a ditch digger to take a typing test.
In determining the type and amount of study necessary as a prerequi-
site to the use of a test to determine "job-relatedness," it has been stated
that:
Some adequate measure of validity is absolutely necessary before the value of a test
can really be known and before the scores on tests can be said to have any meaning
29. Cooper & Sobol at 1653. See also Senator Humphrey's letter to the Amer-
ican Psychological Association, quoted in THE INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGIST, Aug.,
1965, at 6.
30. The congressional response was probably directed toward insuring that tests
with differential racial impact are not rendered illegitimate per se, but that when
validated and suited to a particular job, or set of jobs, they are an appropriate
basis for job selection. However a second interpretation may be that Congress
wanted to grant employers a virtual carte blanche in using pre-employment general
intelligence tests and this was aimed at keeping the Employment Commission from
regulating the employer's use of general intelligence tests.
31. EEOC GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT TESTING PROCEDURES (1966).
32. EEOC Decision, December, 1966.
33. 35 Fed. Reg. 12333 (1970).
34. 35 Fed. Reg. 12333 at § 1667.4(c) (1970).
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as predicators of job success .... The use of unverified tests, whether through in-
nocence or intent, cannot be condoned. . . .Tests must always be selected for the
particular purpose for which they are used; even in similar situations, the same test
may not be appropriate . . . . It is of utmost importance that any tests that are
used, for employment purposes or otherwise, be validated. . . . It is only when a
test has been demonstrated to have an acceptable degree of validity that it can be
used safely with reasonable assurance that it will serve its intended purpose.3 5
Re-enforcing this EEOC decision, is a virtually identical requirement im-
posed by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC).3 6  Car-
rying these ideas to their fruition, job-relatedness standards have also been
adopted by several states.37
35. EEOC GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION PROCEDURES, 35 Fed. Reg.
12333 at §§ 1607.4, 1607.5, 1607.7; OFCC, Validation of Tests by Contractors and
Subcontractors subject to the Provisions of Executive Order 11246, 33 Fed. Reg.
14392, §§ 2, 3, 5 (1968). "Some adequate measure of validity is absolutely neces-
sary before the value of a test can really be known and before the scores on the test
can be said to have any meaning as predictors of job success. . . . The use of un-
verified tests, whether through innocence or intent, cannot be condoned . .. For
example, if a test is known to measure some psychological ability, such as ability
to work with mechanical relations, and certain mechanical performances are re-
quired in the performance of the job, the test still cannot be considered valid
until the scores have been checked against some index of job success." GHISELLI
& BROWN, PERSONNEL AND INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY 187-88 (1955). "Tests must
always be selected for the particular purpose for which they are to be used; even in
similar situations, the same test may not be appropriate. . . . Tests which select
supervisors well in one plant prove valueless in another. No list of recommended
tests can eliminate the necessity for carefully choosing tests to suit each situation.
.. . No matter how complete the test author's research, the person who is de-
veloping a selection or classification program must, in the end, confirm for him-
self the validity of the test in his particular situation. . . . In most predictive uses
of tests, the published validity coefficient is no more than a hint as to whether the
test is relevant to the tester's decision. He must validate the test in his own school
or factory .... ." 1 CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 86, 105,
119 (2d ed. 1960). "It is of utmost importance that any tests that are used, for
employment purposes or otherwise be validated. . . . It is only when a test has
been demonstrated to have an acceptable degree of validity that it can be used
safely with reasonable assurance that it will serve its intended purpose. "The point
to be emphasized throughout this discussion is that no one-whether he is an
employment manager, a psychologist, or anyone else-can predict with certainty
which tests will be desirable tests for placement on any particular job." TIFFIN &
MCCORMICK, INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY 119, 124 (5th ed. 1965). See generally,
FREEMAN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 88 (3rd ed. 1962);
GHISELLI & BROWN, supra, at 210; LAWSHE & BALMA, PRINCIPLES OF PERSONNEL
TESTING (2d ed. 1966); RUCH, PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE 67, 456-57 (5th ed. 1958);
SIEGEL, INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY 122 (1962); THORNDIKE, PERSONNEL SELECTION
TESTS AND MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES 5-6 (1949).
36. See, OFCC, Validation of Tests by Contractors and Subcontractors Sub-
ject to the Provisions of Executive Order 11246, 33 Fed. Reg. 14392, § 2b (1968).
37. California Fair Employment Practices Equal Good Employment Practices,
CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE, 20,861 (19-); Colorado Civil Rights
Commission Policy Statement on the Use of Psychological Tests, CCH EMPLOYMENT
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The EEOC has also been extremely active in determining whether or
not the testing procedures that have been employed are job-related.
Many different factors are taken into account depending on the particular
situation, and consequently, each situation must be judged on its individ-
ual merits. 38
One criteria that is used is the extent to which the specific requirement
is adverse to minority applicants. A requirement which does not result
in a greater preference for whites over blacks need be subjected to little,
if any, examination under the fair employment laws. 3 9  In other words,
the conclusion has been reached that testing procedures do violate fair
employment laws in situations where one minority group is adversely af-
fected, even without regard to the motives of the employer in using the
particular standards. All of this interpretation is notwithstanding the
fact that neither Title VII or Executive Order 11246 employs the re-
quirement that the employer specifically intended to injure a certain
"group" by using the procedures.
The first case to deal squarely with the testing criteria used by em-
ployers was Myart v. Motorola.40  Plaintiff, Leon Myart, had applied for
a job with the Motorola Company. He was given a battery of tests con-
sisting of a five minute verbal test, a mathematical ability exam and a
short interview. He was informed that he would be notified later of the
results, but was never contacted. Myart then filed with the Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Commission stating that the sole reason for Mo-
torola not hiring him was his race and not his achievement on the exami-
nations. The hearing examiner found in Myart's favor, concluding that
he had achieved a passing score, and subsequently ordered Motorola to
stop using their tests. "In the light of current circumstances, . . . this test
does not lend itself to equal opportunity to qualify for the hitherto cul-
turally deprived and disadvantaged groups."'4 1  Congress' response to
PRACTICEs GUIDE, T 21,060 (19-); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,
Affirmative Action Guidelines for Employment Testing, CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAC-
TICES GUIDE, 27,295 (19-).
38. See EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 35 Fed. Reg.
12333 (August 1, 1970). EEOC Decision No. 70-501, Case YAT9-633 (January
29, 1970), in CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE, 6112 (covering several apti-
tude tests including Bennett test used by Duke); EEOC Decision No. 70-552 (Feb-
ruary 19, 1970), in CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE GUIDE, 6139 (covering the Won-
derlic and Bennett tests used by Duke). See also, Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, 484, 485 (D.D.C. 1967).
39. See, Parkam v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.
1970).
40. Supra note 20.
41. 110 Cong. Rec. 9032 (1964).
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this decision was drastic and the reaction almost doomed Section 703(h)
of the Act.42
The first decision indorsing the EEOC position with regard to the test-
ing provisions of Section 703(h) was United States v. H. K. Porter Com-
pany.43  In this case, defendant company employed the tests of the
United States Employment Service (General Aptitude Test Battery-
GATB).44  This battery of tests was used to measure the applicant's
"general intelligence" and "manual dexterity." In sustaining the challenge
to the aforementioned examinations, the court found that the tests given
bore only a superficial relationship to the position for which the applicant
applied. Stating the EEOC principles that were to echo in future deci-
sions, the court said that they agreed in principle "with the propo-
sition that the aptitudes which are measured by a test should be relevant
to the aptitudes which are involved in the performance of jobs . . .-.
Although the court's endorsement of job-relatedness may have served a
useful judicial building block in the eventual ratification of the EEOC
Guidelines, it falls far short of demanding the rigorous procedures that the
Guidelines require.46 Overall, Porter states that if the application of a
test has a substantial, differential impact on members of minority groups,
the employer must examine and present some evidence that the test is
related to the job to be performed.
Following the Porter decision was Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local
212.4 7 Plaintiff, an electrician, challenged the tests administered by the
union local. It was shown that although forty-four presently employed
electricians had taken the test, only three had passed. 48 The union's own
expert testified that the examination was "unfair" and a "mistake." In
42. See text supra.
43. 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
44. The GATB is a lengthy battery of twelve tests requiring two and one half
hours to administer. Nine aptitudes are measured.
45. Supra note 43, at 78.
46. The court did not hold validation necessary to prove job-relation, but
merely assumed for the sake of argument that some form of validation is necessary.
In the GUIDELINES, the requirement of validation compels the selector to have em-
pirical data demonstrating that the test is predictive of the applicant's performance
on criteria of satisfactory work behavior. The relevant criteria for each job must
be carefully described, and the test must be shown to have a statistically significant
relationship to one of the criteria. Then the court indicated that if some validation
is necessary, it will be satisfied by a validation process that is more rule of thumb
than systematic. No data was presented, nor were any statistically Significant
studies conducted.
47. 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
48. Id. at 433.
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finding for Dobbins, the court held the examination unlawful, and even
though objectively fair and objectively graded, to be unnecessarily diffi-
cult. "[T]he fair test of an individual's qualifications to work . . . is
the actual ability to work on the job in the trade for the average (em-
ployee) operating in the trade."' 49  In this same decision, however, the
court found that the tests administered by the apprenticeship committee
of the union were legal because they were "reasonably related to the
proper attitude," and "properly selected" by an expert consultant. 50 How-
ever, the court never made clear how its decision that the examinations
were "properly selected" was determined; there is the inference that it is
less than what is required under the validation process of the EEOC
Guidelines.
Further clarification of these issues emerged in Colbert v. H. K. Corpo-
ration.51 Plaintiff, a secretary, challenged two tests that were adminis-
tered by the employer. The first test, which was of stenographic skills,
was judicially approved since it was convincingly similar to the work re-
quired to be performed on the job. The second test was considered to
be of the type of a general intelligence examination. The court here
stated, citing the Porter decision, that a general job-relatedness standard
was to govern. The test administered here was also used for higher, re-
lated jobs; and since the employer was small, and since the court found
the psychologists themselves in disagreement concerning the proper stand-
ards of validation, they allowed the use of the examinations without em-
pirical study. This case was distinguished from Porter because the test
there had no overt relation to the job to be performed, i.e., manual labor
to general intelligence. In the case at hand, the position tested for was
that of a secretary and it was deemed reasonable to expect a certain level
of achievement in verbal skills and general intelligence of the applicant.
A more recent decision which adds to those of Dobbins and Porter is
Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority,52 where the
court found that if the use of standardized tests produced "defacto racial
pattern of classification adversely affecting . . . minority groups, '5 3 they
were in violation of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Plaintiffs here repre-
sented a class of black and Spanish-speaking persons who had applied for
positions with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA).
In reliance upon the tests, the MBTA offered seventy-five percent of the
49. Id. at 434.
50. Id. at 439.
51. CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE GuIDE, 9.514 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
52. 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969).
53. Id. at 1358.
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white applicants tested a chance at the first two-thirds of the open posi-
tions; while they only offered twenty percent to members of minority
groups. In holding the hiring practices unlawful, the district court said
that the tests would be viable if the use of the tests to determine eligibility
was founded on "a relationship between the aptitudes tested and the de-
mands of the work to be performed.15 4  It is not clear how the required
connection can be demonstrated, however the court implied that a process
more rigorous than casual observation is necessary. Taken with the
Porter decision, Arrington suggests that the line of substantiality of dif-
ferential impact necessary to invoke relief lies somewhat between ten
and twenty-five percent.
In Penn v. Stumpf,55 plaintiff, an adult black male, applied to the
Oakland Civil Service Board of Commissioners to become a police offi-
cer. After being administered the written examination he was informed
that he received a failing score, and consequently was not permitted to
continue on to the oral examination. This cause of action was instituted,
alleging that the sole reason for plaintiff's failing the examination was
the discriminatory nature of the test. The district court, in expanding the
Arrington decision, stated that while a "significant statistical discrepancy
(in hiring practices and test results) is not in itself dispositive, it is at
least some indication that discriminatory forces, albeit subtle ones, may be
afoot."5 6  The court went on to declare that a test which had not been
professionally developed or otherwise validated and which had an adverse
impact on members of minority groups was violative under Title VII.
The most explicit endorsement of the EEOC Guidelines was handed
54. Id. at 1358.
55. 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See also Carter v. Gallagher, 3 EPD
8205 (D. Minn. 1971) (striking down the tests used by the Minneapolis Fire
Department); Western Additions Community Org. v. Alioto, No. 70-1335 (N.D.
Cal. 1971) (striking down the tests of the San Francisco Fire Department); Arm-
stead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School District, 325 F. Supp. 560 (N.D.
Miss. 1971), and Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., - F. Supp. -
(W.D. Miss. June 23, 1971) (striking down the tests of the Mississippi School
Districts).
56. 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1243. See also Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight Inc.,
431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970) the Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "In racial
discrimination cases, statistics often demonstrate more than the testimony of many
witnesses, and they should be given proper effect by the courts." Id. at 247. See
also Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800, 804 (4th Cir. 1970); United States
v. International Bhd. of Elec. Wrkrs., 428 F.2d 144, 151 (6th Cir. 1970); United
States v. United Assoc. of Plumbers Local No. 73, 314 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D. Ind.
1969); Dobbins v. Local 212 International Bhd. of Elec. Wrkrs., 292 F. Supp. 413,
417 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
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down in Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach.57  Plaintiff, a black employee,
showed that 37.8% of the whites versus only 9.8% of the blacks were
passing the Wonderlic Test employed by the defendant corporation.58 In
considering the different and emphatic discrepancies achieved and in the
absence of a study employed to determine if, in fact, the examinations
were predictive of future results in employment, the court found them to
be illegal. "Title VII does not permit an employer to engage in unsub-
stantiated speculation at the expense of the black workers."' 9 Validation
of employment tests would require professional expertise in determining
the job-relatedness and consequently, the EEOC determinations would be
given "great deference" as an indication of the point at which job-related-
ness had been shown. 60
Further defining that the employers do not satisfy their burden of
proving a business necessity simply by showing that a particular business
practice serves legitimate management functions, the court stated in
United States v. Bethlehem Steel, that:
If the legitimate ends of safety and efficiency can be served by a reasonably avail-
able alternative system with less discriminatory effect, then the present policy may
not be continued. 61
In other words, the employer must show not only that the employment
practice in question promotes a legitimate business objective, but also
that there is no less discriminatory alternative practice available by which
to achieve that business objective."
Another outgrowth of the Arrington decision is Chance v. Board of
Commissioners.6 3 Here the court held that a series of examinations used
by the New York Board of Education to qualify and select public school
principals discriminated against black and Puerto Rican applicants and
were in violation of the 14th amendment. 64  It then held that the data
57. 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970).
58. The Bennett Mechanical Test was also administered and a greater disparity
resulted-64% over 15.4%.
59. 310 F. Supp. 536, 538 (E.D. La. 1971).
60. See, Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1964); "Particularly is (great def-
erence) . . . due when the administrative practice at stake 'involves a contem-
poraneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of
setting its machinery in motion, of making the parks work effectively and
smoothly while they are untried and new'. . . . When the construction of an
administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even more
clearly in order."
61. - F.2d -, - (2d Cir. June 21, 1971).
62. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 3 EPD 8, 267 (4th Cir. 1971) at 6901.
63. - F. Supp. - (S.D. N.Y. July 14, 1971).
64. The pass-fail statistics reveal a 31.4% pass rate for blacks and Puerto
Ricans compared to a 44.3% pass rate for white candidates.
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introduced by plaintiffs displayed "a defacto" effect of discriminating sig-
nificantly and substantially against members of minority groups.,,- The
court then issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Board from con-
ducting further examinations of the type found to be unconstitutional.,"
Certain principles emerge, then, from this line of decisions. All of the
foregoing cases call for some showing of job-relatedness, but the proof
required has been diverse; no unvarying standard of empirical validation
has been required. The size of the company, substantiality of the dis-
parate effect, and the frequency of progression to higher, related jobs must
all be taken into account in determining whether a reasonable showing
of business purpose has been demonstrated to override the adverse affect
of the tests administered on minority groups.
The Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Company,7
gave a definitive declaration that the use of unvalidated tests can result
in unlawful racial discrimination. In stating the objectives of Congress
when enacting Title VII, Chief Justice Burger declared that
it (Title VII) was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove bar-
riers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white em-
ployees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures or tests neutral
on their face and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they oper-
ate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory practices.68
Overall, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it will take an
effect oriented approach to cases of employment discrimination. It is
of no consequence what the overt manifestations of the employer might
be or the widespread acceptance of the particular examination. Of con-
sequence will be the effect that these policies and procedures may have
on minority groups.
The immediate result of the Griggs decision is that any criteria for se-
65. See note 63.
66. The court stated that when such a discriminatory impact against a minority
exists: "[A] strong showing must be made by the Board that the examinations
are required to measure abilities essential to performance of the supervisory
positions for which they are given." - F. Supp. -, - (S.D. N.Y. July 14, 1971).
67. Supra note 6.
68. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Mr. Chief Justice Burger ends his opinion with the
following paragraph: "Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring
procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these
devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable
measure of job performance. Congress has not commanded that the less qualified
be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from
disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such qualifications the
controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant.
What Congress has commanded is that any test used must measure the person for
the job and not the person in the abstract." Id. at 436.
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lecting employees which works unfairly against any group must be based
on a business need.69 When the rejection percentage for one class is
higher than that for another, the employer is now required to show that
his sifting and winnowing devices accurately project whether the job ap-
plicant has the ability to perform on the job, i.e., serve a business need.
The new questions that this decision has evinced are numerous, and
consequently it will take more litigation to resolve them. The most cru-
cial question left unanswered regards "the exceptions to be allowed for
discriminatory practices that are demonstrated to be necessary to the safe
and efficient conduct of an employer's business."70  What kind of busi-
ness need must be shown in order to be exempted from Title VII? The
degree of "job-relatedness" is omitted; must there be a 100% correlation
or is 51 % sufficient?
The EEOC, whose Guidelines were adopted in Griggs, takes a rather
restrictive attitude towards the exemptions permitted under a "good faith
job qualification necessary to the normal operation for the business."
Judging the Court on its past performance, it is easily inferrable that the
EEOC's view will again prevail.
Since any employment test is subject to the scrutiny of the courts, the
logical extension of the Griggs decision may very well be in the area of
college and law school admission tests. It is not stretching the definition
of "employment test" to include these tests because there is a definite cor-
relation between a person's performance and the school that subsequently
admits him. From there it is only a small jump to his eventual earning
capacity.
Already litigation has begun involving the Federal Service Entrance
Examination (FSEE). In Douglas v. Hampton,71 a class action by black
plaintiffs72 filed against the Commissioners of the United States Civil Serv-
ice Commission alleges that the reason plaintiffs failed the examination
was due to its inherent discriminatory bias towards members of minority
groups. Plaintiffs contend that the cultural differences experienced by
members of their class places them at a severe disadvantage in achieving
scores of the FSEE that are comparable to those obtained by white appli-
cants. The consequences of this action, if successful, are quite obvious;
69. Id. at 431.
70. This effectively rules out general testing devices, diplomas, and degrees as
fixed measures of capabilities.
71. CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAcTICE GUIDE, 5,158,8 (1971).
72. District Court for the District of Columbia-Civil Action No. 313-71, filed
August, 1971.
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the federal government will be left with thousands of jobs to fill, and an
invalid method of recruitment.
In its total effect, the Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company,
has placed a severe limitation on employers, labor unions and employment
agencies in exercising their independent choices as to future "employees. '73
The ramifications of Griggs are innumerable and conclusive determina-
tions in this area of the law will have to await further decisions by the
courts.
Paul M. Glick
73. Representative defendants took the FSEE in order to qualify for federal
employment positions and general service (GS) ratings, but failed to achieve
passing grades.
